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Abstract 
Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) suggests that the policy process is characterized by long 
periods of incremental change and short periods of punctuated change. The impetus for the latter 
is usually a focusing event that breaks open policy monopolies, allowing for major changes in 
legislative decision-making. While a burgeoning body of literature, a shortcoming in the PET 
literature is that it has yet to explain why focusing events and subsequent breakdowns in policy 
monopolies sometimes fail to result in punctuated policy. We integrate theories on cultural 
change with punctuated equilibrium to explain why focusing events do not always result in the 
dramatic policy changes that we might expect. Specifically, we use the context of national 
energy policy and the lexical database, Google Ngram Viewer, to trace punctuating energy-
related events and the occurrence or lack thereof subsequent policy change from 1952 to 2000. 
Keywords: energy policy, punctuated equilibrium theory, Ngram 
Introduction 
Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) suggests that the policy process is characterized by long periods of incremental 
change and short periods of punctuated change. The impetus for the latter is usually a focusing event that breaks open 
policy monopolies, allowing for major changes in policymaking. While a burgeoning body of literature, a shortcoming 
in the PET literature is that it has yet to explain why focusing events and subsequent breakdowns in policy monopolies 
sometimes fail to result in punctuated policy. We integrate theories on cultural change with punctuated equilibrium to 
explain why focusing events and breaks in policy monopolies do not result in the dramatic policy changes that we 
might expect. We find that focusing events –events that shock a given policy system by pushing issues from the 
smaller policy subsystem venue to the macro-political environment- result in punctuated policy changes when they 
achieve culture penetration. Specifically, we use the context of national comprehensive energy policy and the lexical 
database, Ngram Viewer, to trace the relationship between punctuating energy-related events and the occurrence or 
lack thereof subsequent energy policy change. 
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Literature Review 
 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
 
PET theorizes that policymaking is characterized by two distinct periods – stasis (incrementalism) and dramatic 
change (punctuated change) (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) – and has two distinct venues – the policy subsystem and 
the macro-political environment (Redford, 1969). During periods of stasis, policymaking is monopolized by a narrow 
group of political actors who maintain control over – and benefit from – decisions in a given policy subsystem. As 
such, policymaking is incremental so as not to depart from the way that it has benefitted those that have monopolized 
the subsystem. 
 
In contrast, periods of dramatic change are theorized to be the result of power breakdowns in these policy subsystems, 
which shift policymaking from the subsystem to the macro-political environment. PET suggests that this shift may be 
the result of a focusing event in the policy area of a given subsystem. Attention and scrutiny of those external to the 
subsystem causes policymaking to shift from the subsystem to the macro-political environment. Once in the macro-
political environment, new interests are mobilized to challenge the status quo policymaking of the subsystem. This 
mobilization breaks down existing subsystem monopolies, enabling more dramatic changes in policymaking. 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Cashore and Howlett, 2007). 
 
For example, we might point to the focusing event of 9/11 and the manner in which it shifted terrorism from the policy 
subsystem to the macro-political environment. The result was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(Jochim and May, 2010) and other significant legislation. Similarly, Baumgartner and Jones (2014) highlight the 
manner in which major urban disorders caused crime policy to shift from the subsystem to macro-political system. 
The result was punctuated policymaking in the form of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act (1968) and a 
doubling in federal spending over the next four years (Baumgartner and Jones, 2014). 
 
Although PET has been applied to a number of policy areas, a key gap in the PET literature is explaining why 
successful challenges to policy monopolies do not lead to punctuated policy changes. For example, Givel (2006) 
shows that, even with the glut of information on the dangers of smoking, the massive mobilization of health advocates 
and the rise of tobacco control legislation during the 1990s, the tobacco industry successfully resisted numerous 
regulatory threats and kept state tobacco taxes low. Similarly, Perl and Dunn (2007) trace the evolution of Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards around the world. They show that, after major increases in CAFÉ standards, 
which were the result of power shifts in the interest groups controlling the policy subsystem, policymaking halted 
dramatically in 1985. In both cases, successful challenges to the policy subsystem ushered in by focusing events 
caused changes in policy monopolies. Yet, these changes to policy monopolies failed to lead to punctuated 
policymaking. In other words, the literature has failed to distinguish between punctuating and non-punctuating events. 
 
Some scholars suggest that this gap in the literature can be filled by theoretically and empirically testing the role that 
culture and social movements play in explaining which events result in punctuating policymaking. For example, 
Kenny (2003) contends that, to understand the changing of norms and agendas that shape policymaking, we must 
integrate social movements into our theories. Similarly, John (2003) suggests that we should pay more attention to the 
focusing events that shape policy in order to determine when the punctuation actually begins (489). We take inspiration 
from the aforementioned criticisms by using the construct of cultural penetration to explain why some focusing events 
lead to punctuated policymaking and some do not. The next section begins with an explanation of the constructs of 
culture and cultural penetration and presents a framework for understanding the role that they play in PET. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Cultural Penetration 
 
While culture can be defined in a number of different ways (Kroeber and Kluckholm, 1952; Jahoda, 1984), a key 
component in defining the construct of culture is that it is separate from the community in which is it embedded. “A 
community is not merely a social entity whose members are bound by a web of crisscrossing affective bonds, but also 
one in which members share a set of core values,” in which “values are handed down from generation to generation, 
via socialization, and in this sense are traditional” (Etzioni, 2000, p191). The interactions to which Etzioni (2000) is  
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referring reinforce a give community’s culture by demonstrating its prevalent belief systems, norms and values. So 
long as these belief systems, norms and values are demonstrated through the behaviors of society members, the 
society’s culture is relatively stable.i 
 
However, when focusing events occur and societal norms and values change, the culture experiences disruptions. This 
is to say that culture is a construct that captures the predominant patterns of values and norms within a given space 
and time (March and Olsen, 1989; Hall, 1993). It is not static because norms and values, which are shaped by societal 
events such as urban riots in the 1960s (Baumgartner and Jones, 2014) and 9/11 (May, Workman and Jones, 2008), 
may begin to change. In other words, patterns of norms and values compete for predominance in a given culture. 
Norms and values that successfully infiltrate (and alter) a community’s culture have achieved cultural penetration. 
 
Cultural Penetration as a Mechanism for Punctuated Policymaking 
 
Cultural penetration can be one mechanism for policy change. Events in the political or economic environment that 
achieve cultural penetration lead to punctuated policymaking; events that do not have a cultural impact should not 
lead to punctuation. 
 
Stasis, in this context, is a period of incremental policymaking. During stasis, there is a stable cultural norm controlled 
by the dominant political coalition in a given policy subsystem. This coalition can be made up of multiple groups that 
subscribe to the same policy core beliefs (Jenkins-Smith, et al. 2014) that help form policy images. Policy images, as 
expressions of empirical information and emotive appeals, are manifestations of the cultural norms (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993). By subscribing to these policy images, advocacy coalitions reinforce these norms. Furthermore, policy 
images are signals from the political environment to policymakers. When there is no conflict between cultural norms 
related to a policy issue, there is a singular policy image. Successful policy monopolies remain in control by 
maintaining this singular policy image. As the cultural norms remain in place so do the singular policy image and the 
policy monopolies. 
 
Periods of punctuated policymaking, often begin with a focusing event or series of events that draw attention to 
problems with the dominant policy image and norms in a policy subsystem (Zahariadis, 2007). When conflicting 
norms emerge, there are competing policy images (Kingdon, 1995). This often occurs when the secondary beliefs of 
the dominant political coalition begin to diverge. This divergence results in conflicting norms, which then lead to the 
competing policy images. As new cultural norms are taking hold, more actors are able to become involved in the 
policy issue and the dominant coalition loses control.The inclusion of these new actors results in policies getting 
pushed to the macro political stage (Mortensen, 2009). Once on the macro political stage, policymakers respond during 
an open policy window to the new cultural norms that have become pervasive (Kingdon, 1995). 
 
Thus, to expand the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the mobilization of interests and changing policy image 
are not necessarily the mark of punctuations, the subsequent cultural change is the mark with the mobilization of 
interest groups and changing policy image serving as a manifestation of cultural change. As problems, politics, and 
policies are not completely independent of each other, there is an interaction in which focusing events alter political 
coalitions, which then spur cultural changes leading to new policy images (Zahariadis, 2007).  Following periods of 
punctuations, new cultural norms are established and a new period of stasis is entered. The new cultural norms emerge 
from the conflict between the asymmetries in cultural change. As cultural conflict begins to dissipate, cultural norms 
begin to align and form a new policy image. 
 
The mobilization of political actors is one essential signal of cultural change in the dynamics of punctuations, but there 
are two instances that do not entirely conform. First, interest group mobilizations may occur without cultural changes. 
As previous studies have shown, interests can attempt to punctuate equilibrium without success (Cashore and Howlett, 
2007; Givel, 2008; Givel, 2010; Perl and Dunn, 2007). Interest mobilizations are the result of innovative individuals 
attempting to represent the unorganized or change their behavior to adapt to a changing political environment (Truman, 
1951; Berry, 1977; Richardson, 2000). It is possible for these innovative individuals to misunderstand the 
environmental signals and begin to mobilize. As a result of bounded rationality, individuals can only consider limited 
amounts of information (Simon, 1957, 1997). If the limited information afforded a particular interest is not widespread, 
it will behave inconsistently with the cultural norms. Since there is no widespread cultural change occurring, the 
resultant policy change does not correspond to the interest mobilization.ii 
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Second, policy change may result without the mobilization of new actors. Dominant policy coalitions, which act as 
policy monopolies, can adapt to their environment by altering their belief structures through policy learning (Sabatier 
and Weible, 2007). In other words, policy monopolies can make policy changes in response to environmental changes 
without the introduction of new actors to the policy subsystem. This may occur with technical areas that are ‘policies 
without publics’ (May, 1991). As cultural changes occur policy monopolies can adapt and formulate new policies in 
order to stave off new actor mobilizations and maintain power. In both cases, cultural changes are at the root of policy 
changes. If cultural changes occur, punctuations happen. Interest mobilizations are signals which may or may not 
occur during the process, though. In sum, the cultural impact of events marks the difference between punctuating and 
non-punctuating events. In the following section, we illustrate our methodological approach to identifying cultural 
penetration. 
 
Methodological Approach 
 
The case study focuses on three variable categories as related to U.S. energy policymaking from 1952 to 2000: (1) the 
historical events of the energy markets, (2) policy and institutional changes affecting energy policy, and (3) cultural 
penetration of energy constructs. The time period was chosen as it includes the full service of nine presidents over 48 
years, which provides robust data for analysis. Specifically, 1953 was chosen as the beginning of the first new post-
World War II administration, and 2000 was for the purposes relative to the Google Ngram Viewer databases. 
Additionally, the time period from 1953 to 2000 marks a natural modern period in history (Mayhew, 2005). 
 
A three-part methodology was employed to appropriately position the case study. First, a historical narrative was used 
to synthesize the major events of the energy markets, affecting U.S. energy security. Scholarly sources on the major 
events were used to obtain the relative information. The historical analysis focused on political turbulence in major 
oil producing regions and the transformation of petroleum prices as potential punctuating events. 
 
Second, policy and institutional changes affecting energy policy were identified to create a timeline of energy 
policymaking. The policy and institutional changes were limited to those policy or institutional changes which govern 
a comprehensive energy policy for the nation directed at long-term energy planning as identified in the ‘Energy 
Timeline’ available online from the Department of Energy (Department of Energy, 2011). The ‘Energy Timeline’ 
outlines the major events in the history of Energy from 1939 to 2009. Each item in the timeline between the 
inauguration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the end of the Clinton administration was reviewed and those 
items that created a reform in the comprehensive energy policy of the United States were identified. Between January 
20, 1953 and December 31, 1999, 11 items were identified as affecting the governance of the comprehensive, long-
term energy policy and planning. 
 
We define energy policy as comprehensive national energy planning. As such, any policy should have broad impacts 
on U.S. energy and connect to an over-arching national energy strategy. Policies that may affect energy policy but are 
for a tangential purposes or of a limited focus do not fit within this definition. For example, the Obama 
Administration’s use of regulatory actions under the Clean Air Act have impacted energy policy, but those are not 
part of a wider energy policy strategy or serve as a part of the wider national energy strategy. Alternatively, a policy 
to regulate nuclear safety would be too limited in scope to fit this definition as well. Of course, national energy 
planning can be steered from either presidential initiative (e.g., Nixon’s Project Independence) or Congressional 
lawmaking (e.g., National Energy Acts of 1978). As policy can be made in both venues, they have equal propensity 
to be affected by punctuating events, and in many cases, policymaking is a result of both presidential initiatives and 
Congressional lawmaking. 
 
Third, the ongoing Google Books Project has currently amassed more than 15 million books that are estimated to 
represent approximately 12 percent of all books published since the introduction of the printing press (Bohannon, 
2010; Michel et al., 2011). This effort has resulted in a series of data sources that allow analysis of the written culture 
of the world in a manner previously thought impractical or impossible. This study utilizes a derivative of the Google 
Books Project, termed the Ngram Viewer. It is considered the largest cultural database in existence with over five 
million books and over five hundred billion words. The database originators, Jean-Baptiste Michel and Erez 
Lieberman Aiden, have coined the term ‘culturomics’ to describe this major advance in our ability to quantify written 
culture (Culturomics, n.d.). 
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The Ngram Databases in this research enables a dynamic analysis of key energy concepts as they appear in written 
culture over several decades and then relate these two periods of energy policy formation. Ngrams are words or series 
of words that appear in literature (a 1-gram is a single word; a bigram, a 2-word sequence; a trigram, a 3-word 
sequence; etc…). For our analysis, Ngrams associated with written energy culture were analyzed. After testing a wide 
variety of potential bigrams related to energy concepts and ideas with the potential to have a broad cultural impact, 
the 26 most popular, consistently used terms were selected. After further exploratory data analysis and consideration, 
it was determined these 26 terms represented three distinct domains, and were separated accordingly for analysis.iii  
Alternative forms of the 26 terms, as grams, bigrams, and trigrams (e.g., gasoline, domestic energy policy), were tested 
to confirm reliability of the selected terms and the three domains.  Those tests indicate a consistent pattern suggesting 
the terms and domains utilized in the analysis are reflective of the larger energy related concepts being measured. 
 
In Table 1, the 26 energy terms are organized into three domains: Domestic Energy Policy, International Energy 
Policy, and Energy Technology. These terms tend to be inclusive of energy markets in terms of distribution, demand, 
and production. For comparative purposes, we limited the use of terms to bigrams. The American English Ngram 
Database was then utilized to calculate the annual cultural presence or frequency of each term. Frequencies were 
summed for the items in each domain to calculate an annual composite measure of the domains presence in American 
written culture. These calculations were carried out each year for the period from 1900 through 2000; the entire 20th 
century was included to provide an overview to base magnitude of change. While other methodologies for cultural 
measurement are available, the resulting data allow us to quantify and graphically depict significant patterns of energy 
culture change in the United States over several decades. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The raw Ngram data is interesting, but relies on visual analysis and simple description to draw conclusions. Joinpoint 
regression was, therefore, employed to provide a more substantive analysis of trends. Joinpoint regression works 
similar to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; however, rather than fit a single line to the data, multiple lines are 
fitted to indicate statistically significant changes in trends over time. Joinpoint assumes linearity in data, but only for 
segments of the data. Based on this approach, linear segments are fitted to the data and connected at joinpoints. The 
joinpoints then indicate notable points of change in trends. This method is most commonly used in the epidemiology, 
but is applicable here for its ability to identify changes in trends (La Torre, 2010). In this case, the joinpoint results 
indicate the year a change in trends occurs, and the slope of each trend. From these results, it is easy to identify the 
eras and directional strength of cultural penetration. 
 
The next step in our analysis was to overlay information about the development and formation of energy policy with 
the patterns of Domestic Energy Policy, International Energy Policy, and Energy Technology in written culture. It is 
our contention that PET provides the theoretical framework and conceptual tools that enable us to understand the 
relationship between punctuating events, energy culture, and policy formation that underlie our data patterns. 
 
Results 
 
Historical Events of Energy Markets 
 
The post-World War II period was a tumultuous time in energy. During this period there were crises of supply in the 
form of both dearth and glut, dramatic spikes in the price of oil, and socio-political conflicts in the Middle East (the 
most important petroleum producing region in the world). Both market fluctuations and the socio-political conflicts 
that lead to them represent a traumatic event in the energy markets, with drastic implications for the usage of energy 
worldwide. With this typology of market fluctuations in mind, the energy timeline from 1952 to 2000 can be 
characterized by six events: 1) the Suez Canal Crises; 2) the 1967 Arab Oil Embargo; 3) the 1973 Energy Crisis; 4) 
the 1979 Energy Crisis; 5) the oil glut of the 1980’s; and 6) the Gulf War. Figure 1 shows the timeline of energy crises 
from 1952 to 2000 (for more detail on these events see Yergin, 1992; for an alternative perspective see Klare, 2001, 
2004). Figure 2 shows the average annual domestic oil price from 1952 to 2000. These events involved a similar set 
of circumstances across time, and all carry the same innate potential to be a punctuating event. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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The Suez Canal had been of strategic importance for the transportation of goods from Middle Eastern and Asian ports 
since its completion in 1869; the alternative route involved circumnavigating the African continent. In 1956, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser chose to exercise his legal authority to nationalize the Suez Canal, following a period of growing 
tensions with Britain and France. In response, Britain and France allied themselves with Israel to invade Egypt and 
retake the canal, leading Nasser to order ships sunk to close off the canal, halting its use for shipping (Kunz, 1991; 
Yergin, 1992; Klare, 2004). The crisis was severe enough for the Eisenhower administration to encourage U.S. oil 
companies to coordinate efforts to guarantee oil supply to both the U.S. and its European allies under an anti-trust 
waiver (Nash, 1968). However, prices were not overwhelmingly impact by the events (British Petroleum, 2011). The 
Suez Canal Crisis was a major crisis for the West with scarcity of supply threatening the United States, and its major 
allies. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack on Egyptian forces, following a period of high tensions, wining 
decisive victories against Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian forces (Yergin, 1992; Oren, 2002). Following the surprise 
Israeli attack, oil ministers from the Arab oil producing countries voted unanimously to embargo oil shipments to any 
nations participating in or supporting military action against any Arab nation. However, the pragmatism of many oil 
ministers led to lax enforcement. The world oil market did not see a dearth of supply, but rather Western nations had 
to make logistical modifications to overcome the oil embargo, which included routing oil tankers through third 
countries or tampering with shipping manifests (Yergin, 1992). As a result of world oil supply stability, there were no 
price shocks (British Petroleum, 2011). However, the 1967 oil embargo was a major challenge to the paradigm of oil 
relations between the Western and Arab worlds, for this was the first time in history that Arab nations were refusing 
to supply petroleum to the U.S (Yergin, 1992). 
 
The events of the 1973 Oil Crisis were similar to those of the 1967 Oil Crisis. In October 1973, a combined Egyptian-
Syrian force launched an attack on Israeli territory making major gains in the first four days. In response, oil ministers 
of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries agreed to an embargo of oil to nations who provided Israel 
with military assistance as well as incremental cuts in oil production over time until their economic and political goals 
were met (Yergin, 1992; Klare, 2001, 2004; Rabinovich, 2004). The embargo and production cuts continued until 
March 1974 (Yergin, 1992; Klare, 2004). Due to a nearly 25% cut in Arab oil production, prices nearly quadrupled 
from October 1973 to March 1974, marking the largest price spike in history as well as setting a new record oil price 
for the 20th century. By the end of 1974, oil prices had reached a plateau at their new height, remaining fairly stable 
until 1979 (British Petroleum, 2011). 
 
Before the world was fully recovered from the aftermath of the 1973 Oil Crisis, further instability in the Middle East 
would lead to a second crisis in less than a decade. The 1979 Oil Crisis began with the Iranian revolution, and the 
suspension of Iranian oil production for a short time, followed by a period of inconsistency (Yergin, 1992; Klare, 
2004). The result was a nearly 50% jump in the price of oil, setting a new record for oil in the 20th century (British 
Petroleum, 2011). The beginning of the Iran-Iraq war led to continued declines in Arab oil production (Yergin, 1992). 
The record set in 1980 for price of oil would stand until July 2009 (British Petroleum, 2011). The 1973 and 1979 oil 
crises combined made the 1970’s into a very tumultuous decade. However, both events can be characterized by 
political instability in the Middle East leading to a crisis of supply, and price shocks leading to new records. 
 
The energy crises of the 1970s resulted in two phenomena for the 1980s: high oil prices led to a reduced demand on 
petroleum and Non-OPEC nations were able to become the highest producers, as OPEC nations cut production. The 
result of these two circumstances was the world oil market was flooded with crude oil creating a glut and collapse in 
price (Yergin, 1992; Barsky, 2004). Between 1980 and 1986, the price of oil decreased by nearly 70%. Though prices 
never returned to their pre-1973 level, the price in 1986 was the lowest in more than a decade and was only 25% 
higher than the 1973 level (British Petroleum, 2011). OPEC efforts to stabilize prices and speculation by traders led 
to a price spike in 1987 (Yergin, 1992; Barsky, 2004). This would be the largest price spike in almost a decade, though 
it was short lived (British Petroleum, 2011). The 1980’s was in many ways the contrarian decade to the 1970’s, as it 
can be characterized by price extremes, price spikes, and crises of supply. The 1980’s carried as much potential for 
punctuations as the 1970’s did with the events of the oil market. 
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Finally, on August 2, 1990, Iraq launched an aggressive attack against its neighbor, Kuwait. The goal of the attack 
was to gain control of the rich Kuwaiti oil fields, as well as the economic goods located in Kuwaiti city. The U.S. 
launched Operation Desert Shield deploying troops to the region in response, with a request to other nations to form 
a coalition against Iraqi aggression. In January 1991, Operation Desert Storm began with aerial bombing meant to 
repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The conflict officially ended on February 28, 1991 following the withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait (Klare, 2001, 2004; Finlan, 2003). As a result of halted production of Kuwaiti oil and trader 
speculation, oil prices experienced a spike of nearly 24% (Barsky, 2004; British Petroleum, 2011). Oil prices were at 
their highest since 1985 during and immediately after the conflict (British Petroleum, 2011). 
 
Energy Policy and Institutional Changes 
 
Between 1952 and 2000, there were several developments in comprehensive energy policy. Figure 3 shows the 
timeline of policy and institutional changes from 1952 to 2000. From 1952 to 1972, there is essentially no 
comprehensive energy legislation, policy, or institutional changes at the federal level of government. While there are 
developments in civilian nuclear energy policy and administration, this only represents an isolated part of the U.S. 
energy mixture and does not constitute comprehensive energy planning. Nuclear energy had the lowest production of 
any major source until 1975 when it overtook wood and 1977 when it overtook hydroelectric, but still remains a distant 
fourth behind petroleum, coal, and natural gas. Additionally, there were new environmental policy based reforms that 
affected energy usage, but these were primarily focused on environmental protection and not energy. Policy and 
institutional changes do not begin to occur until mid-1973. Through three administrations (Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson) there was essentially no comprehensive energy policy or planning. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first major changes in U.S. energy policy occurred in a relatively rapid fashion. The first institutional change 
directed at developing a comprehensive policy does not occur until June 1973, with the founding of the Energy Policy 
Office by President Richard Nixon. Less than five months later, in November 1973, Nixon announced Project 
Independence, with the goal of coordinating U.S. resources to achieve self-sufficient energy production free of foreign 
oil. The next month, Nixon replaces the Energy Policy Office with the Federal Energy Office, taking on more 
responsibility and authority. The following May with the signing of the Federal Administration Act, the Federal 
Energy Office was replaced with the Federal Energy Administration moving the responsibility for comprehensive 
energy planning out of the White House and into the federal bureaucracy. As they are typically treated as nothing 
more than a footnote, the institutional changes and policy directions during the Nixon Administration have little 
qualitative importance in the history of energy policy, with the exception of establishing the first comprehensive plans 
and institutional oversight. 
 
During his short administration, President Gerald R. Ford managed to sign to major pieces of energy legislation, 
furthering the Nixon era policies of energy security and independence. The first was the Energy Reorganization Act, 
signed in October 1974, split the functions of the Atomic Energy Commission into several entities, as well as formed 
the precursor to the Department of Energy, the Energy Research and Development Administration. The second was 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, signed in December 1975, which established the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
and extended oil price controls in an effort to better secure U.S. energy reserves. 
 
The Carter Administration was faced with a daunting task of continuing to mitigate the circumstances of the last 
energy crisis in 1973, and then managing the next energy crisis in 1979. President Jimmy Carter’s first major change 
in policy direction was his National Energy Plan announced in a national speech in April 1977. Carter’s speech became 
famous for referring to the energy crisis as the ‘moral equivalent of war’ and setting out 10 principles for U.S. energy 
policy. In August 1977, Carter took the first major step in his National Energy Plan by establishing the Department of 
Energy when he signed the Department of Energy Organization Act. The most significant energy legislation of the 
1970’s came in 1978 with the National Energy Acts. The National Energy Acts consisted of five acts that established 
new policies for public utilities regulation, energy taxes, conservation, power plant fuel use, and natural gas. The final 
instance of energy policy for the Carter Administration was the Energy Security Act of 1980, signed in June. The 
Energy Security Acts consisted of six acts focused on diversifying the U.S. energy mix by encouraging the 
development of renewable energy production in the U.S. 
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After the signing of the Energy Security Acts in 1980,  the U.S. did not adopt a new energy policy program until 1992. 
However, it should be noted as part of the Reagan revolution many of the programs started by the Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter administrations were significantly scaled back or terminated (Perl, 2009). Nevertheless, the changes by the 
Reagan administration were part of a much larger strategy of policy and administrative changes, including 
deregulation and devolution (Durant, 1992; Van Horn, 1996; Troy, 2005). Therefore, these changes may be resultant 
of a separate set of phenomenon as the rest of energy policy changes in this timeline. 
 
President George H.W. Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 1992 in October. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
addressed energy efficiency, energy conservation, energy management, and renewable energy. The general tone of 
the Energy Policy Act was to facilitate a more diversified energy source mixture for the U.S. The Energy Policy Act 
of 1992 was the last energy policy alteration until the George W. Bush administration. 
 
Evolution of Culture Penetration for Energy 
 
While measuring and interpreting culture and cultural change is a difficult and intensive task, the Ngram data provides 
the ability to quantify a previously un-quantifiable concept and allows for a markedly sophisticated analysis of change 
over time. Additionally, the joinpoint regression results indicate the specific years and slopes of changing trends over 
time. There are five notable trends occurring in the data: 1) similar trajectories of change and stability across all three 
constructs; 2) almost non-existent cultural penetration in energy policy and technology prior to 1972; 3) a lack of 
change surrounding events in the energy timeline prior to 1972; 4) a distinctive, unequalled increase in cultural 
penetration from 1972 to 1981; and 5) a sudden decrease in cultural penetration after 1981. Figure 4 shows the trend 
for the domestic energy policy construct; Figure 5, the international energy policy construct; Figure 6, the energy 
technology construct. 
 
[FIGURES 4, 5, and 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
First, all three constructs (domestic energy policy, international energy policy, and energy technology) maintain a 
markedly similar pattern of stasis and change over the 20th century. The policy constructs follow almost the exact 
same trajectory until 1972. The exception is for energy technology, which sees a slightly elevated slope in 1938; this 
is most likely a consequence of nuclear energy research. However, 1972 proves to be the choke point for change in 
all three constructs with a dramatic increase. Second, prior to 1972, cultural penetration in energy policy and 
technology is at a minimum. The period from 1900 to 1972 represents the lowest level of cultural penetration in energy 
over the entire 20th century. The cultural penetration for the policy constructs is essentially at a bare minimum. While 
penetration in energy technology is higher than that for the energy policy constructs, it is still markedly lower than in 
subsequent years. 
 
Third, prior to 1972, events in the energy timeline had no substantive effect on cultural. The exception, again, is for 
the energy technology construct, but this was affected by technological innovation, not politics. For the policy 
constructs, events in 1956 and 1967 have no registered effects based on the joinpoint results. Fourth, after 1972, there 
is an unequivocal increase in cultural penetration in all three constructs. After 1972, there is a distinctive increase until 
1981 (1980 for domestic policy), when a stable decline begins. However, in the international policy construct there is 
an additional change in slope in 1975, but the slope remains positive until 1981. Fifth, after 1981, there is a stable 
decrease in cultural penetration. All three cultural constructs show a drop after 1981 (1980 for domestic policy). This 
marks the end of the punctuating period. 
 
Finally, sometime in the mid-1980s, a residual trend appears with the decline in cultural penetration flattening out. 
This is apparent in the domestic energy policy and energy technology constructs, but not in the international energy 
policy construct. For domestic energy policy, this occurs in 1986; for energy technology, in 1989. This is likely a 
result of the impact of the price collapse and political difficulty in the Middle East. However, it is clear the trends after 
the punctuating period are much different than before. 
 
Discussion 
 
What is the distinction between punctuating and non-punctuating events? From 1952 to 2000, there were six major 
events with punctuating potential based on the crises of supply and price, each presenting new challenges to 
government, business, and the public. Of the events two (the Suez Canal Crisis and the 1967 Arab Oil Embargo) 
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occurred before 1972 and one (the 1980’s oil glut and the Gulf War) occurred after 1981. Prior to 1972, there are no 
significant new policies adopted for comprehensive energy planning or governance. After 1981, only the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 is adopted. However, the period of 1972 to 1981, experienced two oil crises and saw the adoption 
of nine different policy and/or institutional changes for energy governance in the United States. The three periods 
(1952 to 1971, 1972 to 1980, and 1981 to 2000) can be differentiated by the clear cultural penetration in energy at the 
time. From 1952 to 1971, there is only minimal cultural penetration for energy policy, international or domestic, or 
energy technology; the Suez Canal Crisis and the 1967 Arab Oil Crisis only had marginal impacts. From 1972 to 1980, 
there is a substantial increase in cultural penetration of energy policy and technology. Finally, from 1981 to 2000, 
there is a steady decline in cultural penetration, except for a notable change the late 1980’s. Based on these findings, 
it is clear that energy policy adoption occurs in connection to increased cultural penetration, not events; not to say 
events do not influence cultural, though. 
 
As cultural penetration of energy increases, the likelihood for policy adoption increases as well. In 1956 and 1967, the 
Suez Canal Crisis and Arab Oil Embargo had substantial impacts on energy markets but only had minimal cultural 
impacts; thus, policy was not adopted. The same is true of the 1980’s oil glut. However, in 1973 and 1979, the oil 
crises had major cultural impacts; thus, new policy was adopted. The connection between culture and new policy is 
apparently no better than in June 1973. In June 1973, Nixon founded the Energy Policy Office in his White House 
nearly three months prior to the beginning of the oil embargo. Punctuating events can be distinguished from non-
punctuating events based on their cultural impact; events with high cultural impact will cause punctuations, while 
events with low cultural impacts will not. 
 
Finally, in the post-1981 period cultural penetration follows a different trend than in the pre-1972 period. Additionally, 
there is a divergence between the constructs in trends after 1981, suggesting energy policy has become more 
sophisticated in creating differing policy subsystems. After 1981, less important events resulted in a change in trends 
in the different constructs, because the underlining conflict in policy images was already present. For the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, the already heightened conflict for energy policy images resulted in an event with less impact 
triggering action from the policy subsystem. The conflict of the 1970’s resulted in heterogeneity of policy images, 
allowing for a divergence of policy subsystems and substantive potential of events. Similar action would likely not 
have developed from a similar event prior to 1972 due to the homogenous policy images present at that time. On the 
other hand, by 1992, the heterogeneity of policy images allowed for a relatively minor event to result in policy change. 
Thus, a higher level of sustained cultural penetration allows a less significant punctuating event to lead to policy 
change. The inverse is, of course, the lower level of sustained cultural penetration requires a more impactful 
punctuating event to lead to policy change. This is an interesting finding, but requires much more discussion than can 
be devoted to it here. 
 
We want to point out that cultural penetration is one means through which policy frames can occur. Policy images 
may be imposed by powerful actors on less organized and/or less powerful populations (Prewitt and Stone, 1973). 
Alternatively, there may be two coalitions with competing policy images that remain over time. In these cases, we can 
see significant policy change where and continued unrest and competition in the policy venue. For example, there are 
competing policy images of climate change in American society (Whitmarsh, 2011). Yet, the Obama Administration 
engaged in significant policymaking to mitigate climate change. In both of the aforementioned cases, there is no 
cultural penetration but rather another stimulus prompts change. Another causal scenario might be that when 
policymaking occurs during a punctuation period it might be reinforcing the cultural penetration that was caused by 
the focusing event. In other words, the cultural penetration caused by the focusing event is furthered and it becomes 
difficult to strictly separate the source of the cultural penetration. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The findings have notable implications for PET, U.S. energy policymaking, and methodology in public policy 
research. First, the introduction of culture and cultural impact as explanatory variables for policy changes addresses 
one of the most common criticisms of PET. Future research should attempt to apply PET to other units of analysis 
such as local governments and to policy areas to which it has previously not been applied to fully test the limits of its 
foundations and this attempt at expansion. The implications and mechanisms by which culture is translated into policy 
should be further explored within this framework as well. Additionally, previous findings using PET should be 
reassessed with the introduction of culture in an attempt to reconsider the explanatory power of PET and to test the 
validity of the findings here. 
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Second, U.S. energy policymaking appears to be defined by the instability in cultural penetration of energy and in 
energy markets. Energy policy is consistently made during times of crisis, and only appears to be aimed at mitigating 
the current crisis, rather than anticipating or preempting the next. A continuation of this approach is likely to result in 
energy policy being defined by the current conditions of the energy markets. Favorable market conditions will likely 
result in a lack of interest, while unfavorable market conditions will likely result in a significant increase. While the 
analysis only looks at 36 years of data, any casual observer of current trends or amateur historian can confirm that this 
pattern has been pervasive since the beginning of the commercial oil industry. Future research should continue to look 
at the reactive nature of energy policymaking with an eye towards mitigating the current circumstance. Furthermore, 
research should try to better understand the relationship between culture and energy. Energy policymaking may not 
be a simply technical pursuit, and should be considered in other lights. Additionally, we have defined energy policy 
at the federal level as executive or congressional policy action aimed specifically at the United States’ over-arching 
national energy strategy. As such, it may be useful to broaden the definition and level of government at which this 
theory is tested. 
 
Third, there are conceptual and analytic challenges with the construct of cultural penetration. Namely, important, 
punctuating events have a fuzzy conceptual definition. Rather, we rely on our analysis to show us which events are 
important based on whether they lead to cultural penetration. This is conceptually problematic because events are 
determined to be important after the fact. Thus, it will become important to more closely examine the idea of cultural 
penetration and develop a more solid conceptual definition, which is determined by our analysis.  Finally, Ngram is 
a powerful tool for social science research. Like all new research tools and technology, it should be given its fair share 
of scrutiny, but should not be discounted or overlooked. Ngram is limited in its ability to comprehensively capture the 
construct of energy policy nor can it qualitatively tell the difference between important and less important energy 
events. Nonetheless, the ability to quantify culture opens up new avenues for analysis and inquiry. Without Ngram, 
the chart used to show the cultural changes for energy would have required page after page of qualitative research 
from a plethora of sources to obtain the same results. This new tool should be taken seriously as a means to create 
new knowledge and reconsider old ideas. Future research should utilize Ngram as a new and powerful tool for analysis, 
as well as expand its methodological rigor. 
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Table 1. Energy Terms 
 
Domestic Energy Policy International Energy Policy Energy Technology 
o Energy Policy 
o Energy Politics 
o Energy Legislation 
o Energy Planning 
o Energy Regulation 
o Energy Conservation 
o Gasoline Prices 
o Domestic Energy 
o Energy Crisis 
o Energy Independence 
o Energy Security 
o Energy Imports 
o Oil Imports 
o Oil Prices 
o Arab Oil 
o Energy Trade 
o Solar Energy  
o Wind Energy 
o Nuclear Energy 
o Alternative Fuel 
o Alternative Energy 
o Renewable Energy 
o Energy Research 
o Energy Technology 
o Energy Efficiency 
o Fuel Economy 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of Energy Crises, 1952 – 1989 
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Figure 2. Average Annual Domestic Oil Prices, 1952 – 2000 
 
 
Source: British Petroleum, “Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2011, available at 
www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
 
Figure 3. Timeline of Energy Policy and Institutional Changes, 1952 – 1989 
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Figure 4. Joinpoint Results for Ngram: Domestic Energy Policy Construct 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Joinpoint Results for Ngram: International Energy Policy Construct 
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Figure 6. Joinpoint Results for Ngram: Energy Technology Construct 
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